Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
国家税务总局关于取消部分地方税行政审批项目的通知
国家税务总局
国家税务总局关于取消部分地方税行政审批项目的通知
发文字号： 国税函【2007】第629号 发布时间： 2007年06月11日 状态： 有效
国税函〔2007〕629号
各省、自治区、直辖市和计划单列市地方税务局，西藏、宁夏自治区国家税务局：
根据国务院深化行政审批制度改革的要求，为进一步规范行政权力和行政行为，税务总局对涉及房产税、城镇土地使用税、城市维护建设税和印花税的部份行政审批项目文件进行了清理，现就有关问题通知如下：
一、取消下列文件中所含行政审批项目并废止文件
（一）《国家税务局关于对经贸仓库免缴土地使用税问题的复函》（〔88〕国税地字第032号）。
（二）《国家税务局关于对物资储运系统征收土地使用税问题的复函》（〔88］国税地字第035号）。
（三）《国家税务局关于对三线调整企业征免土地使用税问题的复函》（ 〔89〕国税地字第130号）。
（四）《国家税务局关于中国物资储运总公司所属物资储运企业征免土地使用税问题的通知》（国税函发〔1992〕1272号）。
（五）《国家税务局关于石油企业生产用地适用税额问题的通知》（国税函发〔1992〕1442号）。
（六）《国家税务局关于恢复征收国营华侨农场地方税问题的通知》（国税函发〔1990〕1117号）。
（七）《国家税务局关于邮电部门所属企业恢复征收房产税问题的通知》 （国税发〔1991〕036号）。
（八）《国家税务局对〈关于中、小学校办企业征免房产税、土地使用税问题的请示〉的批复》（ 〔89〕国税地字第081号）。
（九）《国家税务局关于对特种储备资金不征印花税问题的通知》（国税地字〔1989〕第018号）。
二、取消下列文件中所列行政审批项目，保留其余条款
（一）取消《国家税务局关于对核工业总公司所属企业征免土地使用税问题的若干规定》（ 〔89〕国税地字第007号）中第三条“上述企业纳税确有困难要求照顾的，可根据《暂行条例》第七条的规定，由企业向所在地的税务机关提出减免税申请，经省、自治区、直辖市税务局审核后，报我局核批”的规定，其余条款保留。
（二）取消《国家税务局对〈关于请求再次明确电力行业土地使用税征免范围问题的函〉的复函》（ 〔89〕国税地字第044号）第三条中“纳税有困难的，由省、自治区、直辖市税务局审核后，报国家税务局批准减免”的规定，其余条款保留。
（三）取消《国家税务局关于对煤炭企业用地征免土地使用税问题的规定》（〔89〕国税地字第089号）第三条“煤炭企业的报废矿井占地,经煤炭企业申请，当地税务机关审核，可以暂免征收土地使用税”和第六条“煤炭企业依照上述规定缴纳土地使用税，确实仍有困难，按照《中华人民共和国城镇土地使用税暂行条例》第七条的规定办理”的规定，其余条款保留。
（四）取消《国家税务局关于对交通部门的港口用地征免土地使用税问题的规定》（ 〔89〕国税地字第123号）第二条“对港口的露天堆货场用地，原则上应征收土地使用税，企业纳税确有困难的，可由省、自治区、直辖市税务局根据其实际情况，给予定期减征或免征土地使用税的照顾”的规定，其余条款保留。
（五）取消《国家税务局关于印发〈关于土地使用税若干具体问题的补充规定〉的通知》（ 〔89〕国税地字第140号）第四条“对基建项目在建期间使用的土地，原则上应照章征收土地使用税。但对有些基建项目，特别是国家产业政策扶持发展的大型基建项目占地面积大，建设周期长，在建期间又没有经营收入，为照顾其实际情况，对纳税人纳税确有困难的，可由各省、自治区、直辖市税务局根据具体情况予以免征或减征土地使用税；对已经完工或已经使用的建设项目，其用地应照章征收土地使用税”和第六条“房地产开发公司建造商品房的用地，原则上应按规定计征土地使用税。但在商品房出售之前纳税确有困难的，其用地是否给予缓征或减征、免征照顾，可由各省、自治区、直辖市税务局根据从严的原则结合具体情况确定”的规定，其余条款保留。
（六）取消《国家税务局关于印花税若干具体问题的规定》（国税地字〔1988〕第025号）中第二十条“对微利、亏损企业不能减免印花税。但是，对微利、亏损企业记载资金的帐薄，第一次贴花数额较大，难以承担的，经当地税务机关批准，可允许在三年内分次贴足印花”的规定，其余条款保留。
以上行政审批项目取消后，各地地方税务机关应依据相关条例的有关规定做好相关税种的征收管理工作，严格按照条例规定和税务总局《税收减免管理办法（试行）》的具体要求加强减免税的管理，并将有关情况及时上报税务总局（地方税务司）。
本通知自发布之日起执行。
国家税务总局
二○○七年六月十一日
